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Another One Bites the Dust!
Bolstered Law Offices and a
Blocked Taxman in Chambre des
notaires du Québec
Amy Salyzyn

I. INTRODUCTION
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Chambre des notaires du Québec the
Supreme Court once again vigorously defended a lawyer’s obligation to
preserve confidential client information.1 The Court’s recent interest in
solicitor-client privilege is significant. Since 2006, the Court has heard at
least 10 cases dealing with solicitor-client privilege, about the same number
it heard during that period related to each of sections 15 and 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”).2 The Court’s
language in these cases reinforces the perception that the Court views
solicitor-client privilege as extraordinarily important. Among other things,
the Court has described solicitor-client privilege as “one of the most ancient

Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. An earlier draft of this article was presented to
the 20th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference at Osgoode Hall Law School on April 7, 2017.
The Author thanks the attendees of this conference for their helpful feedback as well as Vanessa
MacDonnell and Alice Woolley for their thoughtful suggestions.
1
Canada (Attorney General) v. Chambre des notaires du Québec, [2016] S.C.J. No. 20,
2016 SCC 20, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 336 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chambre des notaires”].
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11. In his leading text on solicitor-client privilege in Canada, Adam Dodek observes “[b]etween 19992013, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered no less than thirteen decisions in cases directly involving
the privilege” (A. Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2014), at 15
[hereinafter “Dodek”]). The statistic used in this article uses the cases cited by Professor Dodek between
2002-2013 and adds the additional cases that have been rendered since 2013: Chambre des notaires, id.;
Canada (National Revenue) v. Thompson, [2016] S.C.J. No. 21, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 381, 2016 SCC 21
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thompson”]; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. University of
Calgary, [2016] S.C.J. No. 53, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 555, 2016 SCC 53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “University of
Calgary”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 7,
2015 SCC 7 (S.C.C.) varg Federation of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013]
B.C.J. No. 632 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Federation of Law Societies”].
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and powerful privileges known to our jurisprudence” and as having an
“importance…to our justice system [that] cannot be overstated.”3
One major preoccupation in the Court’s recent decisions on solicitorclient privilege has been the question of when and how the government
may statutorily interfere with the privilege. The Court provides strong
protection for privileged material, precluding any statutory interference
unless expressly authorized.4 It further prohibits any exercise of statutory
authority that might interfere with solicitor-client privilege unless
“absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the enabling
legislation.”5 An additional layer of protection for privileged material
now exists as a result of the Court’s “constitutionalization” of solicitorclient privilege in the early 2000s. The Court classifies the privilege as a
principle of fundamental justice and recognizes that a client has a
reasonable expectation of privacy of “the highest order” in relation to
documents protected by solicitor-client privilege for the purposes of
sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, respectively.6
In Chambre des notaires, the constitutional implications of solicitor-client
privilege were again squarely before the Court. The case dealt with the
constitutionality of a regime under the Income Tax Act that required legal
professionals, upon request, to send client documents and information to tax
authorities. The regime also declared that solicitor-client privilege did not
cover lawyers’ accounting records notwithstanding the fact that such records
might otherwise be considered privileged at common law. The regulatory
body for notaries in Quebec, the Chambre des notaires, challenged the law
under both sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, although, as discussed below, the
Court held that consideration of section 7 was unnecessary after finding a
violation of section 8 that could not be justified under section 1.
3
The first quotation is from R. v. National Post, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, at para. 39 (S.C.C.),
and inspiration for its inclusion here comes from Adam Dodek’s highlighting of this phrasing in
Dodek, id. The second quotation is from University of Calgary, id., at para. 26.
4
Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of Health, [2008] S.C.J. No. 45,
[2008] 2 S.C.R. 574 (S.C.C.) and University of Calgary, supra, note 2.
5
Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] S.C.J. No. 43, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860 (S.C.C.); Goodis v.
Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services), [2006] S.C.J. No. 31, 2006 SCC 31 (S.C.C.); University
of Calgary, id.
6
The two cases establishing these statuses are R. v. McClure, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, [2001]
1 S.C.R. 445, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) (section 7) and Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada
(Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v. Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink, [2002]
S.C.J. No. 61, 2002 SCC 61, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) (section 8) [hereinafter “Lavallee, Rackel &
Heintz”]. For commentary discussing the “constitutionalization” of solicitor-client privilege, see M.
Jamal & B. Morgan, “The Constitutionalization of Solicitor-Client Privilege” (2003), 20 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 213 and A. Dodek, “Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege” (2010), 35 Queen’s L.J. 493-538.
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At one level, not much is new in Chambre des notaires. The Court’s
treatment of solicitor-client privilege under section 8 is largely
consistent with its previous jurisprudence. The decision, however, is
still worthy of extended analysis. The Court’s reasons crystallize the
tension resulting from its characterization of solicitor-client privilege
as a substantive rule not to be interfered with unless “absolutely
necessary” and its parallel efforts to constitutionalize the status of this
rule under a Charter right that allows for “reasonable” searches and
seizures. Considered together with last year’s ruling in Federation of
Law Societies,7 this decision confirms that the Court’s recent attempts
to insulate the lawyer-client relationship from government interference
by using individual Charter rights results in some awkward jurisprudential
gymnastics. More broadly, Chambre des notaires demonstrates that to
evaluate governmental attempts to legislate in relation to the lawyer-client
relationship requires assessing the principle of lawyer independence.
Consequently, it pushes us to adopt a clearer understanding of what
“independence” means than currently exists in the case law, particularly
for constitutional purposes.8

II. BACKGROUND
The facts of Chambre des notaires are straightforward. At issue was a
procedure (commonly referred to as the “requirement procedure”) in the
Income Tax Act (“ITA”) whereby tax authorities can require that a person
send them any information or document for any purposes related to the
administration or enforcement of the Act.9 A failure to comply with a
notice received under this procedure can result in a fine of up to $25,000
and imprisonment of up to 12 months.10

7

Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra, note 2.
Indeed, a number of commentators, including myself and Alice Woolley, have recently
argued this in relation to the Court’s prior jurisprudence dealing with government regulation of
lawyers. See, for example, A. Woolley, “Lawyers and the Rule of Law: Interdependence of the Bar,
the Canadian Constitution and the Law Governing Lawyers” (2015) 34 NJCL 49-74 [hereinafter
“Woolley, ‘Lawyers and the Rule of Law”]; A. Woolley, “Fundamental Justice (Sort of Maybe)
Requires a Lawyer’s Commitment to a Client’s Cause” (2015) 34 NJCL 211-214 [hereinafter
“Woolley, ‘Fundamental Justice”]; A. Salyzyn, “A False Start in Constitutionalizing Lawyer Loyalty
in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)
169 [hereinafter “Salyzyn, ‘A False Start’”].
9
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 231.2(1).
10
Id., s. 238(1).
8
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The constitutionality of a previous, substantially similar, version of the
requirement procedure was upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1990 case
of R. v. McKinlay Transport,11 in relation to its application to taxpayers. The
current case arose because, beginning in 2002, notaries practising law in
Quebec started to receive notices under the requirement procedure
demanding information or documents related to their clients.12 Not
surprisingly, this generated concerns from notaries about breaching their
clients’ rights to professional secrecy. Ultimately, the regulatory body
governing notaries — the Chambre des notaries du Quebec — brought a
declaratory action seeking to have the procedure, as it applied to notaries,
declared unconstitutional. The Chambre also requested that 17 classes of
documents that notaries commonly possess or prepare — including, for
example, marriage contracts and wills — be declared prima facie
privileged. The Barreau du Quebec joined the proceeding for the purposes
of having the requested declaration apply also to the lawyers that it licenses.
Although this case arose because of events in Quebec, tax authorities
had begun to issue requirement notices of this type to lawyers across
Canada.13 The fact that Chambre des notaires began in Quebec is
nonetheless consequential because, technically speaking, the decision
deals with the constitutional implications of the civil law doctrine of
“professional secrecy”, understood to be “enshrined in Quebec’s Charter
of Human Rights and Freedoms”,14 rather than the common law doctrine
of solicitor-client privilege.15 To the extent that there are distinctions in
these doctrines — particularly in relation to their sources — such
distinctions do not materially impact the Court’s discussion in this case
and its impact on the law going forward. Writing for the Court in
Chambres des notaires, Wagner and Gascon JJ. note that, “we are of the
view that there are strong similarities between the common law’s

11

[1990] S.C.J. No. 25, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.).
Mémoire des Appelants, Procureur général du Canada et Agence du revenu du
Canada, at para. 6.
13
See, for example, the following cases in which the Federal Court considered whether
client-related documents requested from a lawyer under the requirement procedure were privileged:
Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. Jakabfy, [2013] F.C.J. No. 797, 2013 FC 706 (F.C.)
(Ontario lawyer); Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. Singh Lyn Ragonetti Bindal LLP,
[2005] F.C.J. No. 1907, 2005 FC 1538 (F.C.) (Alberta lawyer); Canada (Minister of National
Revenue) v. Reddy, [2006] F.C.J. No. 348, 2006 FC 277 (British Columbia lawyer).
14
Barreau du Quebec, “Professional Secrecy”, online: <http://www.barreau.qc.ca/en/public/
relation/secret/>.
15
For a helpful discussion of the doctrine of professional secrecy in relation to solicitorclient privilege, see Dodek, supra, note 2, at 85.
12
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solicitor-client privilege and professional secrecy in the civil law.”16
Indeed, the justices’ reasons treat the doctrines as inter-changeable.17
Three specific provisions of the ITA were at issue in the proceedings.
The first provision, section 231.2(1), enables tax authorities to send a
demand to any person requiring that they send them any information or any
document.18 The one major constraint in this section is that the demand
must be for a purpose “[relating] to the administration or enforcement” of
the ITA.19 The second provision, section 231.7, sets out a procedure to
allow the Minister of National Revenue to obtain a court order in a
case where a person does not comply with a demand sent pursuant to
section 231.2(1).20 In order to make such an order, the judge must be
satisfied both that the person at issue in fact did not comply and that the
documents or information at issue are not protected by solicitor-client
privilege.21 In considering whether privilege applies, the judge is directed to
apply the definition of solicitor-client privilege as found in the ITA.22
16

Chambre des notaires, supra, note 1, at para. 42.
For example, in the opening paragraphs of decision, the justices state that “the professional
secrecy of notaries and lawyers” is “otherwise known as solicitor-client privilege” (Id., at para. 2).
18
Supra, note 9. This provision reads in full as follows:
17

Requirement to provide documents or information
231.2 (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Minister may, subject to
subsection (2), for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of this Act
(including the collection of any amount payable under this Act by any person), of a listed
international agreement or, for greater certainty, of a tax treaty with another country, by
notice served personally or by registered or certified mail, require that any person
provide, within such reasonable time as is stipulated in the notice,
(a) any information or additional information, including a return of income or a
supplementary return; or
(b) any document.
19
20

Id.
Id. This provision reads in part:

231.7 (1) On summary application by the Minister, a judge may, notwithstanding
subsection 238(2), order a person to provide any access, assistance, information or
document sought by the Minister under section 231.1 or 231.2 if the judge is satisfied that
(a) the person was required under section 231.1 or 231.2 to provide the access, assistance,
information or document and did not do so; and
(b) in the case of information or a document, the information or document is not protected
from disclosure by solicitor-client privilege (within the meaning of subsection 232(1)).
21
Id.
22
Id. This provision reads in part:
231.7 (1) On summary application by the Minister, a judge may, notwithstanding
subsection 238(2), order a person to provide any access, assistance, information or
document sought by the Minister under section 231.1 or 231.2 if the judge is satisfied that
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The third provision before the Court, section 232(1), contains the
relevant definition of solicitor-client privilege, which states:
solicitor-client privilege means the right, if any, that a person has in a
superior court in the province where the matter arises to refuse to disclose an
oral or documentary communication on the ground that the communication
is one passing between the person and the person’s lawyer in professional
confidence, except that for the purposes of this section an accounting record
of a lawyer, including any supporting voucher or cheque, shall be deemed
not to be such a communication.23 (emphasis added)

Because legal professionals received no special treatment under this
regime, the above provisions enabled tax authorities to demand that lawyers
or notaries send them client information or documents. The regime did not
require any notice to clients when demands were being made to their legal
professional. There was also no requirement that documents or information
requested from a lawyer’s or notary’s office first be vetted for solicitorclient privilege, either by the legal professional or a judge, before being sent
to tax authorities. In order for privilege to be claimed, the lawyer or notary
would have to refuse to comply with a demand and then defend this refusal
at a subsequent hearing. Additionally, if such a hearing is held, there is the
possibility that the court will order the disclosure of client information or
documents that would otherwise be protected by solicitor-client privilege at
common law because section 232(1) deems all lawyer accounting records
not to be privileged. At common law, a lawyer’s accounting records are not
considered to be categorically or necessarily privileged but do, in certain
cases and circumstances, obtain the protection of solicitor-client privilege.
Accounting records can, for example, include descriptions about why a
client retained a lawyer or be organized in such a way that aspects of the
lawyer’s legal strategy are revealed.24 Whether something in a lawyer’s file
is privileged depends “not on the type of document it is but, rather, on its
content and on what it might reveal about the relationship and
communications between a client and his or her…lawyer.”25

(a) the person was required under section 231.1 or 231.2 to provide the access,
assistance, information or document and did not do so; and
(b) in the case of information or a document, the information or document is not
protected from disclosure by solicitor-client privilege (within the meaning of
subsection 232(1)).
23
24
25

Id., s. 232(1).
Chambre des notaires, supra, note 1, at para. 74.
Id., at para. 73.
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III. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
At first instance, Blanchard J.C.S. of the Quebec Superior Court held
that the provisions at issue were unconstitutional and thus of no force or
effect in relation to notaries and lawyers in Quebec.26 He also granted the
Chambre’s request that certain classes of documents be declared prima
facie privileged in relation to the procedure. The Quebec Court of Appeal
upheld this ruling, except for Blanchard J.C.S.’s declaration that certain
documents be declared prima facie privileged.27
Although the Chambre alleged both section 7 and section 8 violations,
both courts below rested their conclusions on section 8 alone. The same
was true before the Supreme Court of Canada.28 With respect to section 8,
the Court dealt with the first question of whether a seizure had taken
place relatively quickly, noting its previous holding in McKinlay that a
requirement under section 231(3) constitutes a seizure for the purposes of
section 8.29 Notwithstanding the dispositive nature of this holding in
McKinlay, the Court also took pains, in its consideration of this first
question, to emphasize the significant privacy expectations that attach to
privileged information. In doing so, the Court noted, among other things,
professional secrecy’s status as a “fundamental and substantive” rule of
law with “deep significance” and reiterated the proposition that it
“should not be interfered with unless absolutely necessary given that it
must remain as close to absolute as possible”.30
The Court rejected the submission by the Attorney General and the
Canada Revenue Agency that the civil and administrative context of the
requirement procedure diminished a client’s expectation of privacy in
privileged information and documents.31 On this point, the Court
concluded, citing its previous jurisprudence, that “...[t]he protection
afforded to professional secrecy in the context of a s. 8 analysis is
invariably high regardless of whether the seizure has occurred in a
criminal or an administrative context.”32

26

Chambre des notaires du Québec c. Canada (Procureur général), [2010] J.Q. no 8868,
2010 QCCS 4215 (Que. C.S.).
27
Canada (Procureur général) c. Chambre des notaires du Québec, [2014] J.Q. no 2296,
2014 QCCA 552 (Que. C.A.).
28
Chambre des notaires, supra, note 1, at paras. 25-26.
29
Id., at para. 27.
30
Id., at para. 28.
31
Id., at para. 30.
32
Id., at para. 34.
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Having found that a seizure took place, the Court then proceeded to
consider the second question under section 8: whether the seizure was
unreasonable. The Court first noted that “the usual balancing exercise”
under section 8, which involves weighing individual privacy interests
against the state’s interest in the search or seizure, is not “particularly
helpful” given solicitor-client privilege’s status as “a principle of
fundamental justice and a legal principle of supreme importance”.33
Additionally, the Court reiterated its previous jurisprudence instructing
that “any legislative provision that interferes with professional secrecy
more than is absolutely necessary will be labelled unreasonable”34 and
observed “...[a]bsolute necessity is as restrictive a test as may be
formulated short of an absolute prohibition in every case”.35
Given the very restrictive test set up by the Court, it is perhaps
unsurprising that the requirement procedure, insofar as it involves
requests made to legal professionals, was found to give rise to
unreasonable seizures contrary to section 8.36 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court relied on several constitutional “defects” in the requirement
procedure that had been identified by the courts below:37

1. The “client is given no notice of the requirement”.
2. There is “an “inappropriate burden” placed solely on the notary or
lawyer concerned” to claim privilege.

3. It is not “absolutely necessary” to compel disclosure of the
information being sought.

4. “[N]o measures have been taken to help mitigate the impairment of
professional secrecy.”
Although in prior cases, the Court had emphasized that requiring
judicial pre-authorization “is, in itself, an important protection against
improper search and seizure of privileged material” from lawyers’
offices, the Court in this case explicitly stated that judicial preauthorization is not necessary to render the regime constitutionally
compliant.38
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id., at paras. 36-37.
Id., at para. 38.
Id.
Id., at para. 38.
Id., at paras. 44-61.
Id., at para. 52.

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CHAMBRE DES NOTAIRES DU QUÉBEC

181

Having found that the requirement procedure gave rise to
constitutionally intolerable risks that solicitor-client information would
be either inadvertently or intentionally disclosed without the client’s
knowledge, the Court proceeded to consider the constitutionality of
section 231(1)’s definition of solicitor-client privilege. As the Court itself
observed, this additional analysis was necessary because, even if
legislative amendments were made to correct the four defects noted
above, the fact that section 231(1) deemed lawyer accounting records
non-privileged meant that materials which would otherwise be
considered privileged at common law could still be disclosed to tax
authorities under a reformed regime.39 For example, although amending
the regime to require client notice would provide more protection against
lawyers either negligently or intentionally disclosing privileged
information without the client’s knowledge, a different type of risk would
still remain with the continuing presence of section 231(1): that the
lawyer (now with notice to the client) would be required to provide the
tax authorities with materials that would be considered privileged but for
the idiosyncratic definition of privilege within this regime.
In considering the constitutionality of this definition, the Court again
emphasized the importance of privilege and articulated a restrictive
version of the test of absolute necessity:
…[A] legislative provision cannot, by abrogating professional secrecy,
authorize the state to gain access to information that is normally
protected, where the abrogation is not absolutely necessary to achieve
the purposes of the legislation. If the provision does so, the seizure will
be unreasonable and contrary to s. 8 of the Charter. This rule prevents
the state from giving itself, with a clear intention to create a statutory
exception to professional secrecy, the authority to gain untrammelled
access to documents that are normally privileged even though the
state’s operations are facilitated only minimally by access to the
information.40

In applying this test to the definition in section 232(1), the Court
focused on the “broad and undefined” nature of the accounting
exception. It did not identify any persuasive arguments for why, in order
to achieve the purposes of the ITA, it would be absolutely necessary to set
39
Id., at para. 70. Another important layer to this aspect of the case is the fact that the Court
released a companion case the same day — Thompson, supra, note 2 — wherein it held that, a matter of
ordinary statutory interpretation, s. 232(1) constituted a valid exception to solicitor-client privilege.
40
Id., at para. 81.
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aside professional secrecy for such a wide range of documents.41 The Court
also expressed concern about the information obtained through this
permissive definition being possibly used for collateral purposes, noting
that “...[t]here appear to be no restrictions on sharing the information with
government agencies and other public players as long as the CRA does so
for a purpose related to the administration or enforcement of the ITA.”42
In view of the broad nature of the exception and the possibility for
significant collateral consequences, the Court held that the accounting
records exception found in section 232(1)’s definition of solicitor-client
privilege infringed section 8 of the Charter.43 With respect to section 1, the
Court acknowledged that the ITA has a pressing and substantive objective,
“namely, the collection of taxes”, but found that the three provisions could
not be saved under section 1 because they were not minimally impairing for
the reasons provided in the Court’s section 8 analysis.44 In terms of remedy,
the Court ordered that the statutory provisions be read down to exclude
notaries and lawyers from their scope of operation and invalidated the
exception for a lawyer’s accounting records set out in the definition of
“solicitor-client privilege.”45

IV. ANALYSIS
The Court’s analysis in this case does not mark a radical departure from
its previous jurisprudence on solicitor-client privilege. The bottom line
remains the same: the Court views solicitor-client privilege as very
important and will protect it. Notwithstanding this continuity, the means
used to defend solicitor-client privilege in Chambres des notaires are worth
considering more closely. As in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation
of Law Societies of Canada,46 the Court here relies on Charter rights
typically used to protect individuals from excessive or otherwise
inappropriate government interferences to insulate the lawyer-client
relationship from government intrusions. The result is an awkward fit.
In Federation of Law Societies of Canada, the Court considered the
constitutionality of provisions in the Federal Government’s anti-money
laundering and terrorist financing legislation which sought to: (1) impose
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id., at paras. 77-87.
Id., at paras. 86-87.
Id., at para. 78.
Id., at paras. 88-91.
Id., at paras. 92-95.
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra, note 2.
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on lawyers new obligations to collect and keep information about their
clients; and (2) expose lawyers to the possibility of warrantless searches
of their offices by government officials. The Court found that the
provisions breached sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. In the Federation of
Law Societies case, the Court’s section 8 analysis largely rested on the
failure of the regime to prevent the “significant risk that at least some
privileged material will be found among the documents that are the
subject of the search powers in the Act” because the searches were
warrantless and there was no requirement that documents be sealed
before being examined or removed from the lawyer’s office.47 The
Court’s section 7 analysis identified and applied a new principle of
fundamental justice: “commitment to a client’s cause”.48 In finding a
section 7 violation, the Court contended that the regime’s requirement
that lawyers collect and retain information about their clients that was
unnecessary for “ethical and effective representation” and with respect to
which there were insufficient protections for solicitor-client privilege
would unacceptably “reduce [client] confidence …in the lawyer’s ability
to provide committed representation.”49 The themes of risk management
and client trust that appear in Federation of Law Societies result in
muddled constitutional analysis.50 A similar fate befalls the Court in
Chambre des notaires.
Drawing on its previous jurisprudence on law office searches, the
Court in both cases stipulates that the government needs to provide
stringent safeguards to avoid the inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information when it seeks to obtain documents or information from
lawyers’ offices. In Chambres des Notaires, the Court also stresses the
need for the Government to exhaust all other possible alternatives before
it seizes material from a lawyer’s office:
[W]e find that the entire requirement scheme is flawed in that it
authorizes a seizure that cannot be characterized as a measure of last
resort. In the context of a seizure involving information or documents
that may be protected by the professional secrecy of notaries or
lawyers, this presents a problem.

47
Federation of Law Societies, supra, note 2, at para. 42. In its s. 8 analysis, the Court drew
heavily on its previous jurisprudence on law firm office searches, namely: Lavallee, Rackel &
Heintz, supra, note 6.
48
Federation of Law Societies, id., at paras. 74-111.
49
Id., at paras. 108 and 109.
50
Salyzyn, “A False Start”, supra, note 8.
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We agree that the problem in this case is not as acute as in Lavallee or
FLS, which involved physical searches of law offices. The mere service
of a requirement to disclose certain information or documents is not on
the same scale. Nevertheless, we find that it is not absolutely necessary
here to rely on notaries or lawyers rather than on alternative sources in
order to obtain the information or documents being sought. For example,
where the Minister seeks information about specific transactions in which
the client took part, the information would be available from alternative
sources, such as financial institutions, that do not have as onerous an
obligation to safeguard its confidentiality. In this regard, there is no
evidence that the Minister even tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to obtain
the information in question by alternative means before issuing a
requirement to a legal adviser.51

The high threshold established here aligns with the Court’s
entrenched position that solicitor-client privilege must be vigorously
protected. However, there is an incongruity in using this high threshold
in a section 8 Charter analysis that is statutorily tethered to the concept
of “reasonableness”. The conceptual means that the Court uses to get
around this — simply deeming “any legislative provision that
interferes with professional secrecy more than is absolutely necessary”
to be “unreasonable” for the purposes of section 8 — seems
analytically unsatisfactory. Allowing the Government to engage in all
reasonable searches and seizures (as the plain wording of section 8
directs) seems to be fundamentally different than setting up something
close to “an absolute prohibition” on government searches and
seizures by requiring that they be a “last resort” (as the Court wants to
do in relation to privileged material). Moreover, whatever one thinks
of the conceptual coherence of this analytical move, a significant
practical consequence remains: in setting such a high standard, the
Court arguably presents “solicitor-client privilege as a superconstitutional right”, to borrow Adam Dodek’s term, which, as he
notes, makes privilege “very difficult to limit” and risks generating
“a constitutional straightjacket for the Court in future cases where
it wants to recognize a limit on this right.”52 And, of course, any
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“super-constitutional” status sits uneasily with the Court’s repeated
rejections of a “hierarchy of [Charter] rights.”53
In both Federation of Law Societies and Chambres des notaires, the Court
resolves this challenge by falling back on the question of appropriate risk
management. Notwithstanding the language of “last resort” and “absolute
necessity” used, the Court clearly states in both cases that the Government
could design a regime that would allow for law office search and seizures so
long as it sufficiently reduces the risk for inadvertent disclosures of materials
protected by solicitor-client privilege. In adding this qualification to the
analysis, the Court appears to be subtly replacing necessity as the key
yardstick with a test centred on sufficient risk reduction. For example, with
respect to the ITA’s idiosyncratic definition of privilege, the Court in
Chambres des notaires suggests that taking care to craft a more precise
exemption that would allow tax authorities to obtain only those accounting
records that they need could make this section constitutionally compliant.54
The guidance that the Court offers on risk management is curious.
Although, as noted above, the Court lists four ways in which the ITA
requirement procedure is constitutionally defective, it suggests that the
failure to provide client notice is the most significant:
If the client were given notice of the requirement and afforded an
opportunity to independently safeguard his or her right to professional
secrecy before the information was disclosed, the fact that the
requirement is not sent as a last resort would not be fatal to the scheme.
The risk of information protected by professional secrecy being
revealed would then be minimized by the fact that the client would
have an opportunity to challenge its disclosure.55

53

See, for example, Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No.
15, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238, 2005 SCC 15, at para. 26 (S.C.C.) and Reference re Same-Sex Marriage,
[2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79, at para. 50 (S.C.C.).
54
This sentiment is reflected, for example, in Chambres des Notaires, supra, note 1, at para. 84:
The potential scope of the expression ‘accounting record of a lawyer’ is therefore problematic
from the standpoint of the absolute necessity test. The exception set out in the definition of
‘solicitor‑client privilege’ in s. 232(1) of the ITA does not distinguish the many forms that
information in an accounting record can take. For now, all information in an accounting
record is to be disclosed in response to a requirement regardless of the form or the content of
the record. The information may therefore have nothing to do with the Minister’s power of
audit and collection, and the Minister may not need it in order to achieve his or her objective
under the ITA. In fact, nothing in the arguments of the AGC and the CRA suggests why, to
achieve the purposes of the ITA, it would be absolutely necessary to set aside professional
secrecy for such a wide range of documents rather than, for example, doing so only in respect
of the amounts paid and owed by clients.
55
Id., at para. 61.

186

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The proposal to add a client notice requirement provides Parliament
with a clear and seemingly easy way to Charter-proof amended
legislation in this area (provided that issues do not remain with the
definition of solicitor-client privilege in the legislation). As a practical
question of effective risk management, however, the premise that client
notice would provide a robust safeguard against undesirable disclosure of
privileged material is empirically dubious.
On one level, the Court’s claim that “if the client is given notice of the
requirement, the risk of privileged information being disclosed without
his or her consent … would be greatly reduced” is self-evidently true.56 If
a client is notified, it would seem more likely that the client and the
lawyer would discuss the requirement, either because the client himself
or herself contacts the lawyer or the lawyer, seeing that the client is
copied, proactively reaches out to explain the requirement. Practically
speaking, however, there is a real question as to whether, in many cases,
the decision-making process would be substantially different when a
client is copied on a requirement.
The Court contends that, when a client is not copied, there are
“many reasons” why a legal professional might not adequately protect
a client’s right to keep privileged material confidential, including an
honest but mistaken belief that the materials are not privileged, a selfregarding concern about being prosecuted for a failure to disclose or
simply forgetting to verify whether any of the requested material is
protected by privilege.57 On reflection, these types of risks are unlikely
to be substantially mitigated by client notice in many cases. The
question of which client materials are privileged can be legally
complex. If a client is faced with a lawyer who either mistakenly or
self-interestedly tells him or her that the requested documents should
be disclosed, the client is apt to defer to his or her lawyer, who, of
course, the client is paying to be an expert on the law. Given the
importance of solicitor-client privilege, consent in this context must be
robustly informed. Where a client is merely deferring to his or her
lawyer as an expert on the law of privilege, a client may be consenting,
but only in the most superficial sense. In practical terms, providing
client notice may do very little to better facilitate the client’s ability to
meaningfully enforce his or her right to prevent privileged materials
from being disclosed to tax authorities.
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To be sure, even if client notice would not materially change the risk
of disclosure of privileged material, one can imagine the argument that
any remaining risk is not “unreasonable” for the purposes of a section 8
analysis in light of the fact that, to use the Government’s words, the
“Canadian tax system is based on the principle of self-reporting and selfassessment, which means that the tax authorities must rely on broad
powers of audit to ensure the system’s integrity.”58 At this point,
however, we loop back to the problem of incongruity between the
Court’s strong rhetoric about solicitor-client privilege and the
reasonableness analysis under section 8. The level of risk that would
remain with an added client notice requirement is hard to square with the
Court’s pronouncement that “any legislative provision that interferes
with professional secrecy more than is absolutely necessary will be
labelled unreasonable”.59
This is particularly true given the Court’s explicit refusal to mandate
judicial pre-authorization for ITA seizures from lawyers’ offices or even
the much less onerous step of first requesting documents from other
possible sources, like financial institutions. Regardless of one’s position
on the ultimate merits of a more relaxed approach, everyone should be
concerned with an inconsistent constitutional analysis that posits the
most stringent possible test of “absolute necessity” but then measures
government interferences against a much lower standard. If the Court is
uncomfortable with the implications of the “constitutional straightjacket” it has created by constitutionalizing solicitor-client privilege it
would be healthier to evaluate this doctrinal move at a first-principles
level, rather than trying to Houdini out of this self-imposed constraint.60
Additionally, the Court seems to have painted itself into a corner by
suggesting, in its analysis of the ITA’s definition of solicitor-client
privilege, that it might be constitutionally permissible to allow the
Government to search and seize material that would otherwise be
considered privileged, so long as the enabling legislation is sufficiently
precise in exempting the material at issue and the search or seizure can
be characterized as “absolutely necessary to achieve the purposes of the
legislation.”61 Surely, precision and necessity cannot be the only
applicable criteria? If solicitor-client privilege is, in fact, a rule with
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“deep significance and a unique status in our legal system”;62 “a civil
right of supreme importance in the Canadian justice system”;63 and “a
principle of fundamental justice”,64 among other things, one would
imagine that it takes more than precise legislative drafting and a close
connection to legislative purpose (regardless of what that legislative
purpose might be) in order to legislatively derogate from it.
Moreover, the jurisprudence that has considered lawyer regulation in
the context of section 7 of the Charter does not offer a useful alternative
to consider the constitutionality of state interferences in the lawyer-client
relationship. In this jurisprudence, the issue of client trust replaces risk
management as the governing concept. In both Federation of Law
Societies and Chambres des notaires, the Court expressed concern about
lawyers’ offices being treated as “archives” for government authorities
seeking information about clients.65 In the Federation of Law Societies
case, the majority repeatedly emphasized in its section 7 analysis the
need for clients to have confidence that their lawyers are operating with
undivided loyalty and are providing “committed representation”.66 In
support of its conclusion that the regime in that case violated section 7,
the majority in the Federation of Law Societies case found:
...The reasonable and well-informed client would see his or her lawyer
being required by the state to collect and retain information that, in the
view of the legal profession, is not required for effective and ethical
representation and with respect to which there are inadequate
protections for solicitor-client privilege. Clients would thus reasonably
perceive that lawyers were, at least in part, acting on behalf of the state
in collecting and retaining this information in circumstances in which
privileged information might well be disclosed to the state without the
client’s consent. This would reduce confidence to an unacceptable
degree in the lawyer’s ability to provide committed representation.67

The ITA’s requirement procedure gives rise to similar concerns and,
thus, implicates the new principle of fundamental justice declared in the
Federation of Law Societies case: the lawyer’s duty of commitment to a
client’s cause. However, several commentators, including myself, have
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argued that the majority’s section 7 analysis in Federation of Law
Societies and, in particular, its use of this new principle of fundamental
justice is an awkward fit for the Court’s legitimate concerns about state
interference in lawyers’ work.68 It is unfortunate that the Court did not
take the opportunity in Chambres des notaires to try to resolve these
issues or, in the alternative, acknowledge that there are intractable
problems with using “commitment to a client’s cause” as a principle of
fundamental justice. If the Government does amend the ITA requirement
procedure to require client notice with a view to making it Charter
compliant, a section 7 challenge may well be part of any subsequent case
brought by legal regulators. It would have been helpful for the Court to
provide at least some guidance as to what section 7 might require in
these circumstances.

V. CONCLUSION: INDEPENDENCE OF THE BAR AS A WAY OUT?
By constitutionalizing solicitor-client privilege, the Court has
powerfully reinforced the importance of this concept to the proper
functioning of our legal system and has given itself a new tool to protect
the lawyer-client relationship from state interference. But, now, with
more than a decade of this constitutionalization behind us, it is becoming
more and more apparent that individual Charter rights, such as sections 7
and 8, are an awkward mechanism to insulate the lawyer-client
relationship from government interference.
The question of when the government can impose demands on the
lawyer-client relationship for its own ends — whether it be preventing
money laundering or collecting taxes — inextricably involves a
consideration of what independence of the bar means and why it is
important. At stake in cases like Chambres des notaires and
Federation of Law Societies is the degree to which clients can access
legal services unimpeded by inappropriate interference by the state.
This access is the key interest protected by solicitor-client privilege.
As stated by the Court: “The lawyer’s obligation of confidentiality is
necessary to preserve the fundamental relationship of trust between
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lawyers and clients.”69 Access to legal services is also the interest that
the Court sought to protect in recognizing “commitment to a client’s
cause” as a new principle of fundamental justice in Federation of Law
Societies. There, the Court proclaimed: “...A client must be able to
place ‘unrestricted and unbounded confidence’ in his or her lawyer;
that confidence which is at the core of the solicitor-client relationship
is a part of the legal system itself, not merely ancillary to it…. The
lawyer’s duty of commitment to the client’s cause, along with the
protection of the client’s confidences, is central to the lawyer’s role in
the administration of justice.”70
Once we recognize, as we must, that the state has some interest in
what goes on in the lawyer-client relationship — no one argues, for
example, that lawyers should be their clients’ “dupes” or criminal
“accomplices” to use the language in the Federation of Law Societies
case — it is necessary to articulate the boundary between appropriate and
inappropriate government interference in the lawyer-client relationship.71
To articulate this boundary, one needs a clear understanding of
independence of the bar and why it is important. As Alice Woolley and
others have explained, the Court’s jurisprudence lacks such an
understanding.72 At the very least, the Court’s continued constitutional
consideration of the limits of state interference in the lawyer-client
relationship requires that independence of the bar be foregrounded and
that a more sophisticated understanding of this concept be presented.
The analytical problems raised in this article show no sign of
disappearing any time soon. It has been suggested that the federal
government is currently looking at ways to amend its anti-money
laundering and terrorist financing regime to make it constitutionally
compliant as it applies to lawyers.73 Lawyer regulators are apt, no doubt, to
challenge any amended legislation. Moreover, given the Court’s signalling
in Chambres des notaires that a minor change of providing client notice and
a more precise definition of solicitor-client privilege could render the
regime at issue constitutionally compliant in relation to legal professionals,
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it seems possible that we might see new legislation in this area as well. The
upshot of more refined legislation may be pressure on the Court to provide
a more sophisticated analysis of how the Constitution protects the lawyerclient relationship. Alternatively, the Court may simply retreat into more
familiar doctrinal concepts, regardless of any resulting analytical muddle.
Time will tell which route will be taken.

